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Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between linguistic polarization and conﬂict in the
Basque Country. During the 40 years of Franco’s dictatorship the use of the Basque language was banned.
Therefore, there may be some linguistic roots underlying the conﬂict in the Basque Country. We show
that at the municipality level, linguistic polarization reduces the level of conﬂict. This ﬁnding is robust to
various ways of measuring linguistic and ideological polarization and the inclusion of other covariates. In
addition, we ﬁnd that a high level of the stock of human capital is beneﬁcial for reducing conﬂict intensity.
Keywords Linguistic Polarization, Fractionalization, Terrorism, Conﬂict.
1 Introduction
From an economic point of view, the relationship between ethno-linguistic fragmentation and conﬂict is
important as conﬂict is thought to be detrimental to economic growth and, therefore, understanding the
sources of conﬂict would help economic development. The available evidence indicates that ethno-linguistic
fragmentation is associated with lower quality of institutions and bad economic performance (e.g., Easterly
and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 2003). This evidence can be interpreted as lending support to theories of
clashing interest groups (e.g., Esteban and Ray 2008, 2011).
This paper focuses on the relationship between linguistic fragmentation and conﬂict. Establishing a
causal link between linguistic fragmentation and conﬂict is intricate for several reasons. A ﬁrst diﬃculty
is measurement. Linguistic diversity manifests when diﬀerent social groups speak diﬀerent languages, i.e.,
society is fragmented into diﬀerent linguistic groups. Linguistic fragmentation in a country or region can
be measured in diﬀerent ways. A commonly used measure is the index of fractionalization deﬁned as the
probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to diﬀerent linguistic groups. An alternative way
of measuring linguistic fragmentation is the concept of polarization, deﬁned as the distance between the
frequency distribution of linguistic groups to the bipolar distribution, which yields the highest level of
polarization. A country with two linguistic groups, each group comprising half the population, would be
polarized to the highest possible degree, but much less fractionalized. On the contrary, a country like
Chad with 131 living languages must necessarily be highly fractionalized, but polarized to a lesser extent.
It turns out that using fractionalization or polarization measures of linguistic diversity may result in
diﬀerent causal inferences. For instance, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) provide evidence suggesting
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that ethno-linguistic polarization increases the likelihood of internal armed conﬂict while ethno-linguistic
fractionalization does not.
When society is divided in two demographic groups, fractionalization and polarization indexes turn
out to be linearly dependent and there is no diﬀerence between using one or the other as far as the
statistical inference is concerned; see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Due to this linear relationship
between polarization and fractionalization, the two concepts can be used interchangeably. Hereinafter,
when referring to previous works we will use the speciﬁc term used by the authors, which may create some
confusion as some use fractionalization and others use polarization.
A second diﬃculty arises from the nature of conﬂict itself. Conﬂict can manifest itself in diﬀerent forms,
through strikes, demonstrations, riots, guerrilla warfare, terrorism or civil war. Conﬂict can be thought of
as a latent variable on which researchers observe measurements such as a binary indicator of participation
in an armed conﬂict, the number of casualties in a civil war or the number of terrorism events. It comes as
no surprise that alternative conﬂict measurements result in diﬀerent causal eﬀects. Laitin (2000) reports
evidence suggesting that language grievances are not associated with group violence, while Abadie (2006)
ﬁnds that linguistic fractionalization is a determinant of terrorism risk.
A third diﬃculty appears in distinguishing between linguistic and ethnic groups: ethnic groups are
often deﬁned by their language. Therefore, when researchers try to assess the eﬀect of ethnic and linguistic
fragmentation on conﬂict, there is no clear-cut distinction between the contribution of ethnic and linguis-
tic diversity to conﬂict. This is probably why many researchers focus on ethno-linguistic fractionalization,
instead of considering both separately. A notable exception is Wimmer and Cederman (2009), who found
that, once ethnic fractionalization is controlled for, linguistic fractionalization is not a signiﬁcant deter-
minant of armed conﬂict. To the extent that some ethnic groups are deﬁned by their language, ethnic
fractionalization might capture some linguistic fractionalization and, hence, may take some explanatory
power away from linguistic fractionalization.
In this paper, we study the relationship between linguistic polarization and conﬂict using municipality
level data for the Basque Country. As we will argue below, the Basque Country constitutes an especially
interesting and appropriate case study for the issue at hand. Contrary to what theory, intuition and the
cross-country evidence suggest, our ﬁndings indicate that linguistic polarization in the Basque Country
actually reduces the level of conﬂict. However, the evidence presented in the following sections does not
contradict previous empirical evidence nor falsiﬁes available theory. Modern theories of ethnic conﬂict
suggest that polarization induces conﬂict (e.g., Esteban and Ray 2008). How can linguistic polarization in
the Basque Country reduce the level of conﬂict? An interpretation of this result might be that greater levels
of linguistic polarization open a channel through which Basque speakers can manifest their nationalism by
using their language regularly. Linguistic polarization could serve as an escape valve for conﬂict, reducing
the probability of engaging in terrorist activities. When polarization is low, however, it is more diﬃcult to
manifest nationalism through the use of the Basque language, either because most or only a few people
speak Basque.
The level of disaggregation of our study is important. While cross-country diﬀerences in ethno-linguistic
polarization might indicate the existence or absence of a potential source of conﬂict, ethno-linguistic po-
larization at the municipal level indicates group mixing which might actually be beneﬁcial in reducing
the level of conﬂict. To make the argument more precise, consider the example of a society with two
demographic groups, each containing half of the population. Polarization in this society would be equal
to 1, its maximal value. Suppose now that people in this society live in two towns. Further suppose that
each town is home to one demographic group. In this case, despite the fact that overall polarization is
1, within-town polarization is 0, its minimal value. Alternatively, suppose now that each town holds half
of each demographic group. Then, both overall and within town polarization would be 1. In the former
case, when each group lives in a town, there is no group mixing while in the second case group mixing isLinguistic Polarization and Conﬂict in the Basque Country 3
complete. The mixing case can occur only if the two groups can live together in the same town. It seems
intuitive to think that, in this simple example, the overall level of polarization could be an indicator of
conﬂict while the within-town level of polarization can be an indicator of peace.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the case study analyzed in this paper
and explains the identiﬁcation strategy used to make statistical inferences about the relationship between
linguistic polarization and conﬂict. Section 3 identiﬁes some potential confounding factors in our analysis.
Section 4 describes the data set used, which is described further in the Appendix. Section 5 reports the
empirical results and Section 6 summarizes and discusses the main ﬁndings.
2 The case
In this paper, we conduct what we think is an interesting case study of the relationship between linguistic
fragmentation and conﬂict using data from the Basque Country.1 Basque and Spanish are the two oﬃcial
languages in the Basque Country. As the Basque Country is a bilingual community, we need not distinguish
between linguistic polarization and fractionalization.
Our case study exhibits some features that make it especially worth exploring. The more salient feature
of this case study relates to the linguistic roots of the conﬂict. Until the middle of the nineteenth century,
Basques had a peaceful relationship with the Spanish Crown. After the Carlists Wars, when the Spanish
government revoked some of the Basque Country’s autonomy, Basques began demanding more rights of
self-governance, but it would not be until a century later, in 1968, when the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
terrorist organization would produce its ﬁrst victim. After the Spanish Civil War, during Franco’s dicta-
torship (1936-1975), the use of the Basque language was banned and repressed. Therefore, it is reasonable
to think that after a long period of repression, the linguistic issue in the Basque Country could be a source
of conﬂict.
Social cleavage theory is another reason to blame linguistic issues for the conﬂict in the Basque Country.
Desmet et al. (2009) provide evidence indicating that fractionalization measures based on deep linguistic
cleavages dating back thousands of years are better predictors of conﬂict than more superﬁcial ones dating
back only hundreds of years ago. As Basque is the last remaining pre-Indo-European language in Western
Europe and hence very diﬀerent from Spanish, this linguistic distance between the two main languages
spoken in the Basque Country can be considered as a predictor of conﬂict. Other bilingual regions in Spain,
Catalonia and Galicia, constitute prima facie cases of this theory. Catalan and Galician share a much closer
ancestor with Spanish: Latin. While Catalonia and Galicia also have had nationalistic demands, they have
not experienced a terrorist conﬂict comparable to the Basque.
Another interesting feature of our case study is the ethno-linguistic cut of the population under study.
Ethno-linguistic diversity in the Basque Country has a strong linguistic basis. The term Euskaldun is used
in Basque language to refer to both a Basque person and a Basque speaker, which suggests that a Basque
person is someone who speaks Basque.
It has long been argued that Basque people were a genetic isolate. Their genomes have been considered
to be the most direct descendants of those who dwelt in Europe before the spread of agriculture (e.g.,
Dupanloup et al. 2005). However, recent research based on genome-wide analysis shows that Basques
are not genetically diﬀerent from other populations in Spain (e.g., Laayouni et al. 2010). Therefore, the
diﬀerence between the two ethno-linguistic groups in the Basque Country is fundamentally linguistic and
does not have a genetic component.
1 Henceforth, we use the term Basque Country to refer to the Spanish autonomous region Comunidad Autónoma
Vasca (Euskadi in Basque) comprising the provinces of Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya (Araba, Gipuzkoa and
Bizkaia). Basque is also spoken in Navarre in Spain and the Northern Basque Country in France.4 Javier Gardeazabal
A further interesting feature of our case study is the absence of religious motivation. Recent research
shows that religious factors are conﬂict determinants (e.g., Baseadau et al. 2011; Esteban and Mayoral
2011). However, most Basques are Roman Catholic regardless of their linguistic group. As there are no
religious diﬀerences between linguistic groups, religion cannot be a confounding factor in our analysis.
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the geographical variation in linguistic polarization across munic-
ipalities. The Basque Country exhibits a fairly high geographical heterogeneity in Basque language use,
providing a source of variability in linguistic polarization. Linguistic polarization is bound to change very
little within a short period.2 However, as a result of the rapid rise in the number of Basque speakers after
its decades-long suppression as well as demographic movements explained below, linguistic polarization has
experienced a relatively large change during the sample period analyzed providing an additional source of
variability diﬃcult to observe in any other region or country during an equivalent period of time.
Variability in linguistic polarization across space and time is not suﬃcient to identify a causal link
with conﬂict. Should these sources of variability be exogenous, identiﬁcation would be obtained. However,
the possibility exists that these sources of variability in linguistic polarization might not be exogenous.
Migration patterns might invalidate the exogeneity assumption. During our period of analysis, there was
a sizeable inﬂow of immigrants, mostly from Spanish-speaking countries, to the Basque homeland. If these
immigrants chose destinations with perceived less conﬂict, changes in linguistic polarization would not be
exogenous. Immigrants from other Spanish regions and migrants between Basque municipalities might also
choose their residences conditional on the level of conﬂict. Furthermore, it is well known that many people,
particularly entrepreneurs, have abandoned the Basque Country over recent decades owing to the threat
of terrorism and extortion. These demographic movements might aﬀect the level of linguistic polarization
and therefore create a reverse causality problem. This potential endogeneity problem is accounted for in
the estimation by using dynamic panel data techniques that allow us to use lagged levels and diﬀerences
of the endogenous variables as instruments.
3 Potentially confounding factors
The analysis also takes into account the eﬀect of other covariates which could otherwise have a confound-
ing eﬀect on the relationship between linguistic polarization and conﬂict. In particular, we control for
ideological, economic and demographic factors.
Ideological or political diﬀerences can certainly be potential sources of conﬂict. However, establishing
a causal link between these variables is problematic. First of all, ideological diﬀerences are diﬃcult to
measure. Party vote shares might serve the purpose of measuring the degree of ideological polarization
or fractionalization. However, ideological polarization measured this way limits the analysis to democratic
countries. In the case of the Basque Country, we can account for political polarization using party vote
shares at the municipal level. Secondly, as the number of political parties is greater than two, political
polarization and fractionalization are not linearly related as it was the case for linguistic polarization. In
this case, we cannot use polarization and fractionalization as synonymous. Thirdly, another reverse causality
problem may appear if violence plays a role in shaping people’s ideology and therefore their political choices.
Available evidence for the United States, Israel and Spain suggests that vote shares are aﬀected by terrorist
activity (Karol and Miguel 2007); Gould and Klor 2010; Gardeazabal 2010). Hence, both linguistic and
political polarization can be considered as endogenous explanatory variables. As mentioned above, the
dynamic panel data methodology can account for this endogeneity problem.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
2 Campos and Kuzeyev (2007, 2011) ﬁnd that 26 transition economies experienced a relatively important change
in ethnic fractionalization over a two decades period. However, linguistic fractionalization remained fairly constant
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Arguably, the Left/Right and Nationalist/Non-Nationalist cleavages might have diﬀerent eﬀects on
conﬂict. These eﬀects cannot be identiﬁed when using individual party vote shares to measure political
polarization and fractionalization. Therefore, we also measure political polarization along the Left/Right
and Nationalist/Non-Nationalist ideological dimensions. This is possible because political parties in the
Basque Country cover all Left/Right and Nationalist/Non-Nationalist combinations as illustrated in Table
1. Since the conﬂict in the Basque Country is a nationalist one, it seems reasonable to think that polarization
along the Nationalist/Non-Nationalist ideological cleavage should explain some of the conﬂict. However,
polarization along the Left/Right dimension might also contribute to explaining the conﬂict. The two main
parties in Spain, Partido Socialista and Partido Popular place the terrorist conﬂict in the Basque Country
among the top items on their political agendas and often approach it from diﬀerent perspectives and blame
each other in this regard.
Cross-country studies suggest that economic factors are not signiﬁcant determinants of conﬂict (Abadie
2006; Piazza 2006). However, economic adversity in the form of poverty or inequality can induce conﬂict
and violence if they align with ethnic, religious or ideological cleavages (Kanbur 2007; Sen 2008). The
Basque Country does particularly well in economic terms and economic issues do not seem to be the root
source of conﬂict. Nevertheless, in order to be on the safe side, our empirical analysis also accounts for
economic factors. In particular, we use the unemployment rate and an index of economic activity at the
municipality level to account for the potential eﬀect of economic conditions on conﬂict.
There is another demographic factor that might have some bearing in the relationship between lin-
guistic polarization and conﬂict in the Basque Country: the stock of human capital of the Basque Country
population. The relationship between the stock of human capital and violent conﬂict has been analyzed
elsewhere. For the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) report evidence indicating
that Palestinian terrorists tend to be better educated than the average Palestinian. In particular, engineers
are overrepresented among other Islamists terrorist (e.g., Gambetta and Hertog 2009). Using data from
the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, Benmelech et al. (forthcoming) likewise ﬁnd that higher unemployment
rates allow terrorist organizations to recruit better educated terrorists. Unfortunately, we have no access
to data on the level of educational attainment among ETA terrorists, however, anecdotal evidence suggests
that this is also the case in the Basque Country. In October 13th, 1997, Ibon Gogeaskoetxea (B.A. in
Journalism) and Eneko Gogeaskoetxea (B.Sc. in Engineering) killed a policeman when he foiled a plot to
stage a terrorist attack during the opening ceremony of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao by King Juan
Carlos on October 18th. However, the stock of human capital of a municipality may not be related with
the stock of human capital of a particular individual who self-selects to be a terrorist. The relationship
between the stock of human capital of a society and the level of conﬂict is important as educational policy
might have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on conﬂict depending on the sign of this relationship. Previous research into
this policy eﬀect suggests that education can have constructive and destructive impacts on conﬂict (e.g.,
UNICEF 2000).
Another confounding factor could be the degree of urbanization. This is particularly important because
rural municipalities tend to have a large size of the Basque linguistic group. Hence, in order to control for
the potential eﬀect of urbanization, we include population in our regressions.
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
Another confounding factor could arise from the fact that this empirical analysis is carried out within
a time interval when the overall level of conﬂict in the Basque Country was decreasing, see Figure 1. The
existence of this downward trend in the dependent variable makes it non-stationary, posing a problem for
statistical inference. Our empirical analysis controls for this downward trend by including period-speciﬁc
dummy variables. These period-speciﬁc dummies have the potential to capture all those municipality-
invariant factors having a common eﬀect on all municipalities, such as political instability or anti-terrorist
policy. Cross-country empirical studies suggest that political instability is a signiﬁcant determinant of6 Javier Gardeazabal
conﬂict (e.g., Reynal-Querol 2002). For the Basque Country case, the level of political instability across
municipalities should be the same. However, political instability at the beginning of the sample period was
surely high and then fell to low levels by the end of the sample. Anecdotally, Tejero’s attempted coup
d’état on February 23th, 1981, would be unthinkable by the end of the sample. Accordingly, the overall
level of conﬂict has decreased over the sample period analyzed.
In addition to a downward trend, the overall level of conﬂict in the Basque Country has experienced ups
and downs, that is, deviations from the trend. In our empirical analysis, these ﬂuctuations are captured
by using a dynamic panel data modeling strategy which captures the oscillating pattern of the conﬂict
measurement.
Our empirical evidence shows that political fractionalization and polarization do have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the level of conﬂict. According to our ﬁndings, greater political polarization is associated with
higher levels of conﬂict. Political polarization along the Left/Right dimension also correlates positively
with conﬂict; however, political polarization along the Nationalist/Non-nationalist dimension is negatively
correlated with conﬂict intensity. Another interesting ﬁnding is the beneﬁcial eﬀect of a larger stock of
human capital on conﬂict, suggesting that education in the Basque Country might have had a constructive
type of eﬀect on conﬂict. Finally, some of the economic indicators used in the empirical analysis turn out
to be signiﬁcant.
4 The data set
The data set is an unbalanced panel of 250 municipalities located in the Basque Country over an 18-year
period (1989-2006) with annual frequency.3 The variables included in our data set are described below.
Our outcome variable is terrorism activity measured by the annual number of assassinations in each
municipality. Of course, the number of terrorist assassinations is only a proxy measure of the latent level of
conﬂict. Although admittedly a proxy, there are reasons to believe that the number of terrorist assassina-
tions in a municipality may actually be a good indicator of the latent level of conﬂict in that municipality.
It is well known that ETA targets as victims law enforcement forces, politicians and entrepreneurs through
its militant network. ETA’s network informs the actual perpetrators of the location and habits of targeted
victims. Therefore, the observation of an assassination can be taken as an indication of the existence of a
terrorist network within the area. Under these circumstances, geographical dissemination of assassinations
indicates network density which in turn signals conﬂict intensity.
A zero number of assassinations in a municipality does not imply that there is no conﬂict in a given
town. ETA’s network orchestrates physical and psychological violence on its victims, see Martín-Peña et
al. (2010). This violence ranges from coercion and extortion at the lower end to kidnappings and murder
at the higher end. According to this scale of violence, the number of assassinations only records events at
the upper side of the scale. This is also consistent with the latent variable interpretation of conﬂict, which
suggests that a conﬂict indicator such as the annual number of assassinations in each municipality records
instances when conﬂict is above a certain fairly high threshold.
As ETA militants living in a town may actually follow and report on the habits of targeted people
in neighboring towns, the number of assassinations might be considered a measurement with error. We
have constructed an estimate of the latent level of conﬂict as a weighted average of assassinations in
neighboring towns to mitigate this error. The resulting conﬂict index assigns positive values to towns with
zero assassinations but neighboring towns with positive number of assassinations. To the extent that ETA’s
network may operate from nearby localities, our spatially weighted measure of conﬂict might be a better
indicator of conﬂict than the raw number of assassinations.
3 There are 251 municipalities in the Basque Country. We excluded Ziortza-Bolibar because of lack of data.Linguistic Polarization and Conﬂict in the Basque Country 7
This spatially weighted index of the latent level of conﬂict is estimated as follows. The index value for
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period t, k(dij) is a weight that depends on the distance between municipalities i and j, dij. The weighting

















where h is the bandwidth parameter and I(a) = 1 if a is true and zero otherwise. Distances between
municipalities are computed using the spherical law of cosines. The bandwidth parameter, h, is the radius
of the circle deﬁning neighbor municipalities. Thus, if the distance between municipalities i and j is less
than h, the indicator function takes the value of one and the number of assassinations in municipality j
enters the index value for municipality i. However, the actual value of the weight is heavier, the closer
municipalities are to one another. This spatial kernel measure of conﬂict is smoother than the simple
count of the yearly number of assassinations. It assigns positive values to municipalities which have no
assassinations but are geographically close to other municipalities where there were killings.
This spatial conﬂict index does not account for exposure to conﬂict. That is, it does not take into account
the size of the municipality. If targeted victims were selected randomly, more populated municipalities would
be the venues of greater numbers of assassinations because the probability of observing an assassination
in a highly populated municipality would be larger. We divide our index by thousands of people in each
municipality to account for exposure to conﬂict. Figure 2 shows the variation of the spatial index of conﬂict
across municipalities.
[Insert Figure 2 near here]
Data on all the explanatory variables were available with diﬀerent frequencies. We have constructed
an annual data set by interpolating several variables. Detailed deﬁnitions of all variables and interpolation
method are provided in the appendix.
Our data set records the number of people belonging to each linguistic group for each town in the
Basque Country. Linguistic groups are deﬁned according to three classiﬁcation methods: mother tongue,
language spoken at home and Basque knowledge. For instance, using the mother tongue taxonomy, people
are classiﬁed into four categories: Basque, Spanish, both and other. The ’both’ category is not a third
linguistic group, as treating it as another linguistic group would artiﬁcially bias our measures of linguistic
polarization. Almost all Basque speakers are able to speak Spanish, while the opposite is not true, so we
merged the ’both’ and ’Basque’ categories. On the other hand, the ’other’ category is always very small, so
we can eﬀectively think of a two-class taxonomy. Therefore, the diﬀerence between fractionalization and
polarization is irrelevant.
The mother tongue taxonomy of linguistic groups does not perfectly ﬁt the purpose of our analysis.
For an individual, their mother tongue certainly is exogenous, but as argued above, linguistic polarization
at the municipal level need not be exogenous. In addition, what is important for our analysis is whether
people identify themselves with a linguistic group. Over recent decades, the number of people who speak
Basque has increased greatly and many people whose mother tongue is Spanish have learned Basque at
school. An indication of this fact is that the correlation between linguistic polarization measured using
the mother tongue and Basque knowledge taxonomies is only 0.35. Note that linguistic groups deﬁned by
Basque knowledge might result in an additional endogeneity source of linguistic polarization.8 Javier Gardeazabal
[Insert ﬁgure 3 near here]
[Insert ﬁgure 4 near here]
[Insert ﬁgure 5 near here]
[Insert Table 2 near here]







where πi is the proportion of people who belong to the linguistic (political) group i, and N is the number
of groups. As discussed previously, the data set exhibits a remarkably large variability of linguistic polar-
ization across municipalities. Table 2 shows that linguistic polarization ranges from 0 to 1 according to all
three taxonomies. Figure 3 plots linguistic polarization for all municipalities as of 2006 as a function of
the size of the Basque mother tongue linguistic group. The ﬁgure documents the rather large variability
in linguistic polarization, which ranges from 0.07 to 1, thus covering almost the entire unit interval. It
also shows that maximal polarization corresponds to cases where the fraction of Basque linguistic group
is about half the population. Had there been only two linguistic groups, circles on the graph would be on
top of a curve deﬁned by a quadratic function and the maximum would be at a size of the Basque lin-
guistic group equal to 0.5. This ﬁgure also shows that as the size of the Basque linguistic group increases,
polarization increases if the size is below, roughly, 0.5 and decreases above that point. In fact, the size
of the Basque linguistic group has changed over time. During our sample period, on average, the size of
the Basque linguistic group has increased (decreased) in towns with Basque linguistic groups whose size is
below (above) 0.5. As a result, the average linguistic polarization has increased from 0.43 in 1986 to 0.60
in 2006. This upward trend in linguistic polarization is illustrated in Figure 4. In addition, Figure 5 shows
how linguistic polarization varies across municipalities.
[Insert Figure 6 near here]
[Insert Figure 7 near here]
We measure ideological fragmentation using data from parliamentary elections. In particular, we use
party vote shares from Spanish General Elections. Figure 6 illustrates the persistence of political polar-
ization over time. Variability over time in political polarization does not seem to provide an avenue for
identifying a causal eﬀect on conﬂict. Fortunately, political polarization exhibits high variability across
municipalities, as illustrated in Figure 7. Political polarization measured using individual party vote shares
ranges from 0.34 to 1. Political polarization on the Left/Right dimension ranges from 0.3 to 1 and in
the Nationalist/Non-Nationalist dimension from 0 to 1. Political fractionalization is measured using the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, FRAC = 1−
PN
i=1 π2
i . Political fractionalization measured using individual
party vote shares ranges from 0.17 to 0.99. This variability in political polarization and fractionalization
provides a source of ﬂuctuation to identify the causal eﬀect of political fractionalization and polarization
on our conﬂict measure.
In addition to ideological factors, we also control for the stock of human capital, proxied by the fraction
of people with academic degrees (Four and ﬁve-year licences and Doctoral degrees). This variable also
exhibits a wide range from 0 to 0.28. We use the rate of unemployment to control for economic ﬂuctuations.
The unemployment rate, which is very persistent over time, likewise exhibits a wide range of variation
between municipalities from 0 to 0.36. We also use another measure of economic performance, the number
of ﬁnancial establishments per thousand people, which indicates the economic relevance of a municipality
but exhibit less cyclical ﬂuctuations than unemployment. This indicator ranges from 0 to 14.3.
5 Empirical results
The dynamic panel data model speciﬁcation is
φ(L)yit = X
′
itβ + ηi + µt + εit, (3)Linguistic Polarization and Conﬂict in the Basque Country 9
where φ(L) = 1 + φ1L + ... + φpLp is a p-th order polynomial in the lag operator L; yit is the value
of the spatial conﬂict index for municipality i in year t; Xit is a vector of explanatory variables which
includes linguistic polarization and other covariates; ηi is a municipality speciﬁc unobserved eﬀect; µt is
a period-speciﬁc unobserved eﬀect and εit is a zero mean random disturbance. The GMM methodology
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is used to estimate this model.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
We report baseline regressions in Table 3. In all cases, the spatially weighted conﬂict index uses a
bandwidth of 10 kilometers and a full set of period-speciﬁc dummies. Column (1) in Table 3 reports a
ﬁxed-eﬀect regression of the spatial conﬂict index on linguistic polarization (Basque knowledge taxonomy)
and political polarization. The coeﬃcient estimate on linguistic polarization is negative and signiﬁcant,
while the coeﬃcient on political polarization is positive and insigniﬁcant. These results are likewise set
out in column (2) which includes a signiﬁcant lagged value of the spatial conﬂict index. We report GMM
estimates from this point on as ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates of dynamic panel data models are known to be
inconsistent.
Our empirical speciﬁcation allows for two characteristics of the data. First, columns (3) to (6) include
three conﬂict index lags. The ﬁrst two lags of the conﬂict index are statistically signiﬁcant in all cases,
while the third lag is retained as the residuals exhibit autocorrelation if omitted. Note that the coeﬃcient
estimates of the lags of the conﬂict index alternate in sign, which indicates that the dependent variable
exhibits some oscillatory pattern. Second, in all cases a full set of period-speciﬁc dummy variables was
included. These dummies, not reported in the tables, turn out to be signiﬁcant and capture the non-
stationary nature of the dependent variable.
Column (3) treats linguistic and political polarization as exogenous, that is, the estimation method uses
moment conditions which make use of the assumed orthogonality between these variables and the distur-
bance. Columns (4) to (6) report estimates that account for the feasible endogeneity of linguistic and polit-
ical polarization by using moment conditions which make use of the orthogonality between lagged values of
these variables and the disturbance term. Linguistic polarization is signiﬁcant and has negative coeﬃcient
estimate in all cases. Political polarization has a positive coeﬃcient estimate and is marginally signiﬁcant
in column (4). In columns (5) and (6) we include alternative measures of political polarization and frac-
tionalization. Column (5) suggests that political polarization along the Left/Right and Nationalist/Non-
Nationalist dimensions are signiﬁcant determinants of conﬂict. Polarization on the Left/Right front seems
to contribute to conﬂict in the Basque Country, while polarization along the Nationalist/Non-Nationalist
axis is beneﬁcial, reducing the level of conﬂict. A feasible interpretation of this ﬁnding is that politi-
cal clashes in the Nationalist/Non-Nationalist front may substitute for other forms of conﬂict. What is
important is that, even after controlling for political polarization along the nationalist front, linguistic
polarization tends to reduce the level of conﬂict.
Finally, political fractionalization turns out to be signiﬁcant and has a negative coeﬃcient estimate
in column (6). This might be interpreted as meaning that as all political ideologies tend to be equally
represented (fractionalization tends to its maximal value), the intensity of conﬂict diminishes.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
Table 4 reports similar regressions, this time controlling for other covariates, such as population, the
fraction of people holding an academic degree, the unemployment rate and the number of ﬁnancial estab-
lishments per thousand people. The stock of human capital measured by the fraction of people holding an
academic degree is signiﬁcant and has negative sign in columns (2) and (5). This evidence suggests that
education plays a beneﬁcial role in the Basque Country conﬂict. Population and the unemployment rate
are statistically insigniﬁcant in determining conﬂict intensity. Finally, economic relevance of a municipality,
as measured by the number of ﬁnancial establishments in per capita terms is signiﬁcant and has negative
sign in column (5). This ﬁnding indicates that good economic performance alleviates conﬂict intensity.10 Javier Gardeazabal
[Insert Table 5 near here]
Table 5 reports the same regressions as in Table 4 including political fractionalization instead of political
polarization. Linguistic polarization remains signiﬁcant in all cases. The main diﬀerence with respect to
previous results is that political fractionalization has a negative sign, indicating that more fractionalization
actually reduces the level of conﬂict. Therefore, political fractionalization and polarization measures appear
to have opposite eﬀects on conﬂict.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
Further robustness tests are reported in Table 6. The beneﬁcial eﬀect of linguistic polarization remains
signiﬁcant across linguistic taxonomies in columns (1) to (3). However, when the mother tongue and
language used at home taxonomies are entered, signiﬁcance levels are higher. As a ﬁnal robustness test,
columns (4) and (5) repeat some of the previous regressions using an estimate of the conﬂict index computed
with a bandwidth of 20 kilometers. The results do not change qualitatively.
6 Conclusions and discussion
This research leads to three main ﬁndings. First, the empirical evidence reported in this paper suggests
that linguistic polarization in the Basque Country reduces the level conﬂict. Second, political polariza-
tion along the Left/Right dimension has positive eﬀect on conﬂict while political polarization along the
Nationalist/Non-Nationalist dimension has a negative eﬀect on conﬂict. Third, the stock of human capital
in a municipality seems to have a negative eﬀect on conﬂict.
A caveat worth mentioning at this point is that all the evidence reported herein relies on the quality
of our spatially weighted conﬂict index. Should this index be an imperfect measurement of the latent level
of conﬂict at the municipality level, our inferences would be invalid. Provided we meet this requirement,
our ﬁrst ﬁnding, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of linguistic polarization on conﬂict requires an explanation, as it is
apparently at odds with previous results found in the literature.
Note that the beneﬁcial eﬀect of linguistic polarization at the municipality level is perfectly compatible
with the Basque conﬂict having a linguistic root. Our reading of the results is as follows. Linguistic, or ethno-
linguistic polarization are sources of conﬂict; however when someone looks at the linguistic polarization at
a suﬃciently ﬁne level of disaggregation, polarization indicates group mixing, which in fact indicates that
diﬀerent groups can live together peaceably. As argued above, linguistic polarization can serve as an escape
valve for conﬂict, reducing the probability of engaging in violent activities. When linguistic polarization is
high, Basque speakers can use their language to manifest their nationalism, while this is not possible when
linguistic polarization is low.
In addition, as argued in the introduction, our analysis has been carried out during a time interval
where the overall level of conﬂict in the Basque Country has been decreasing. This time-wise decline
in the intensity of conﬂict was accounted for empirically by using period-speciﬁc dummies that capture
all the eﬀects common to all municipalities. Therefore, while we ﬁnd some beneﬁcial eﬀect of linguistic
polarization, this might not be responsible for the overall decrease in the level of conﬂict, which is probably
induced by period-speciﬁc unobserved eﬀects.
Another ﬁnding that requires further comments is the role of the stock of human capital in reducing the
level of conﬂict. This is not the ﬁrst time education has been found to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect in reducing
conﬂict. Azam and Thelen (2008) report cross-country evidence in line with our ﬁnding. According to
UNICEF (2000), education can have constructive or destructive eﬀects on conﬂict-prone regions. Education
can be counterproductive for conﬂict if administered unevenly among ethnic or linguistic groups, or used
as a weapon in cultural repression by manipulating history or textbooks. In the Basque Country case,
all people have access to public education which is taught both in Basque and Spanish at the primary,Linguistic Polarization and Conﬂict in the Basque Country 11
secondary and post-secondary levels. Thus, our evidence indicates that education policy in the Basque
Country must have been of the constructive type.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that linguistic polarization at the municipal level is
beneﬁcial for reducing conﬂict. As this is a case study limited to the Basque Country experience, our
conclusions may not be extrapolated to other cases. Ideally, further evidence from other conﬂict regions
could provide external validity to the results reported here.
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Appendix: Variable deﬁnition and interpolation
– Terrorist assassinations. Annual number of terrorist assassinations for each municipality. Source: Asociación
de Victimas del Terrorismo.
– Electoral data. Number of valid votes for each party: Partido Popular (PP), Partido Socialista Obrero Español
(PSOE), Izquierda Unida (IU), Centro Democrático y Social (CDS), Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), Herri
Batasuna (HB), Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) and Aralar. The Left/Right classiﬁcation is: Left (PSOE, IU, HB, EA,
Aralar) Right (PP, CDS, PNV). The Nationalist/Non-Nationalist classiﬁcation is: Nationalist (PNV, HB, EA,
Aralar) Non-Nationalist (PP, PSOE, CDS, IU). Source: Spanish Ministerio del Interior.
– Linguistic taxonomy based on mother tongue. The ﬁrst language learned in infancy up until the age of
three, distinguishing between children who were exposed only to Basque in their early infancy, those who only
learned Spanish, those who were exposed to both Basque and Spanish almost simultaneously and ﬁnally, those
children whose mother tongue was neither Basque nor Spanish. Raw data on the number of people in each
category for each municipality transformed into proportions of population in each category. Source: EUSTAT.
– Linguistic taxonomy based on language spoken at home. The language most frequently spoken within
the household. The same categories as used for Mother Tongue are admitted: Basque, Spanish, both or other.
Raw data on the number of people in each category for each municipality transformed into proportions of
population in each category. Source: EUSTAT.
– Linguistic taxonomy based on Basque knowledge. There are three levels of Basque knowledge: Basque
speakers, those people whose mother tongue is Basque and who understand and speak it well; almost-Basque
speakers, those whose mother tongue is Spanish or another language except Basque and who understand and
speak Basque well and whose everyday spoken language at home is Basque; non-Basque speakers are those
whose mother tongue is Spanish or a language other than Basque and who do not speak Basque at all and
neither understand nor read it well. Raw data on number of people in each category for each municipality. We
added the number of people in the Basque and Almost-Basque speakers categories into a single one. The data
then were transformed into proportions of population in each category. Source: EUSTAT.
– Population. Number of inhabitants of each municipality in a given year. Source: EUSTAT.
– Unemployment rate. The number of employed and unemployed people are added up to obtain an estimate
of the active labor force. Then the unemployment rate is computed as the ratio of unemployed people to the
active population. Source: EUSTAT.
– Fraction of people holding an academic degree. The proportion of people holding an academic degree
as a fraction of population. Academic degrees include four and ﬁve-year licences and Doctoral degrees. Source:
EUSTAT.
– Number of ﬁnancial establishments. The raw number was divided by thousands of people. Source: EUSTAT.
– Latitude and Longitude coordinates. In degrees, minutes and seconds and then transformed into radians.
– Distance between municipalities. Computed from geographical coordinates using the spherical law of
cosines.
– Interpolation. The procedure used for interpolation is as follows. Suppose we observe xt and xt+s with s ≥ 2,




. All variables interpolated are stocks. Table 7
lists the variables in column (1), the dates for which a particular variable is available in column (2) and the
estimation sample after interpolation in column (3).
[Insert Table 7 near here]12 Javier Gardeazabal
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Table 1 Left/Right vs. Nationalist/Non-Nationalist
Left Right




Non-Nationalist Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) Partido Popular (PP)
Izquierda Unida (IU) Centro Democrático y Social (CDS)
32.53% 16.30%
Aggregate vote shares for the Basque Country. 1993 General Elections.14 Javier Gardeazabal
Table 2 Summary Statistics
Variable # Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Assassinations 7000 0.05 0.36 0 8
Conﬂict Index / 1000 people (h = 10 km) 7000 0.02 0.08 0 1.56
Conﬂict Index / 1000 people (h = 20 km) 7000 0.07 0.23 0 4.61
Population 7000 8460.86 30569.95 78 393821
Polarization Mother Tongue 5250 0.48 0.34 0 1
Mother Tongue Basque 5250 1696.80 3371.67 0 37076
Mother Tongue Spanish 5250 6236.34 26899.92 0 343127
Mother Tongue Both 5250 339.88 1218.51 0 14734
Mother Tongue Other 5250 149.56 634.61 0 10517
Polarization Language used at home 4000 0.49 0.34 0 1
Language used at home Basque 4000 1138.22 2045.16 0 20456
Language used at home Spanish 4000 6499.02 27704.99 0 347335
Language used at home Both 4000 705.63 1885.59 0 21172
Language used at home other 4000 57.67 244.13 0 4035
Polarization Basque Knowledge 6500 0.51 0.34 0 1
Basque Speakers 6500 2372.77 5547.41 0 83354
Almost Basque Speakers 6500 1620.93 6738.34 0 91204
Non-Basque Speakers 6500 4270.79 19203.79 0 301430
Political Polarization 4969 0.75 0.08 0.34 1
Left/Right Polarization 4969 0.88 0.14 0.3 1
Nationalist/Non-Nationalist Polarization 4969 0.75 0.26 0 1
Political Fractionalization 4969 0.7 0.11 0.17 0.99
Number of votes 4969 4870.82 17975.01 2 225279
PSOE votes 5000 1165.13 4665.82 0 72055
PP votes 5000 856.41 4420.19 0 69648
IU votes 5000 304.86 1350.44 0 21148
PNV votes 5000 1295.53 4558.58 0 71736
HB votes 5000 377.11 1419.54 0 23727
EA votes 5000 395.31 1188.77 0 17204
UCD votes 5000 38.21 341.7 0 7589
Aralar votes 5000 36.63 211.8 0 4495
Fraction of Population with academic degree 5250 0.06 0.04 0 0.28
Unemployment Rate 3984 0.15 0.06 0 0.36
Number of ﬁnancial institutions / 1000 people 5621 1.05 1.46 0 14.31Linguistic Polarization and Conﬂict in the Basque Country 15
Table 3 Baseline regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conﬂict index at t-1 0.109*** 0.223*** 0.248*** 0.238*** 0.248***
(0.0154) (0.0163) (0.0177) (0.0197) (0.0161)
Conﬂict index at t-2 -0.0768*** -0.0558*** -0.0618*** -0.0399**
(0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Conﬂict index at t-3 0.0308 0.0371 0.0126 0.0376
(0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0231) (0.0251)
Linguistic Polarization -0.0141* -0.0132* -0.0977*** -0.0239*** -0.0331*** -0.0338***
(0.00773) (0.00722) (0.0224) (0.00631) (0.00762) (0.0114)
Political Polarization 0.0180 0.0131 0.0259 0.0644*







Constant 0.00399 0.00599 -0.351* 0.162* -0.188 0.612***
(0.0233) (0.0217) (0.194) (0.0962) (0.158) (0.157)
First order autocorrelation -2.8474*** -2.8471*** -2.8658*** -2.8904***
Second order autocorrelation -1.0384 -1.2871 -1.4855 -1.2113
Observations 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469
Number of Municipalities 250 250 250 250 250 250
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include
period-speciﬁc dummies. First and second order autocorrelation tests of residuals in the diﬀerenced
model.16 Javier Gardeazabal
Table 4 Other Covariates / Political Polarization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conﬂict index at t-1 0.238*** 0.225*** 0.234*** 0.237*** 0.219***
(0.0297) (0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0201) (0.0200)
Conﬂict index at t-2 -0.0641*** -0.0702*** -0.0644*** -0.0643*** -0.0785***
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0150)
Conﬂict index at t-3 0.0137 0.00469 0.00832 0.0136 -0.000347
(0.0216) (0.0240) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0239)
Linguistic Polarization -0.0248*** -0.0314*** -0.0444*** -0.0337*** -0.0191**
(0.00724) (0.00804) (0.00921) (0.00874) (0.00824)
Political Polarization 0.0958*** 0.0659*** 0.0729*** 0.0747*** 0.0659**
(Left/Right) (0.0275) (0.0209) (0.0235) (0.0230) (0.0303)
Political Polarization -0.0261* -0.0242* -0.0254* -0.0246* -0.0198
(Nationalist/Non-Nationalist) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0151) (0.0138) (0.0126)
Population (in thousands) -0.0783 -0.0558
(0.0541) (0.0559)
Fraction of people with academic degree -0.429*** -0.509***
(per thousand people) (0.151) (0.176)
Unemployment rate 0.106
(0.149)
Number of ﬁnancial establishments -0.00208 -0.00531**
(per thousand people) (0.00158) (0.00226)
Constant 0.0359 -1.188*** -0.664 -0.000228 -1.058**
(0.148) (0.458) (0.970) (0.178) (0.512)
First order autorcorrelation -2.8352*** -2.8649*** -2.8592*** -2.8678*** -2.8635***
Second order autocorrelation -1.3711 -1.4959 -1.5886 -1.4109 -1.4231
Observations 4,469 4,469 3,969 4,444 4,444
Number of Municipalities 250 250 250 249 249
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include
period-speciﬁc dummies. First and second order autocorrelation tests of residuals in the diﬀerenced
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Table 5 Other Covariates / Political Fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conﬂict index at t-1 0.241*** 0.230*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 0.206***
(0.0136) (0.0155) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0162)
Conﬂict index at t-2 -0.0437*** -0.0523*** -0.0470*** -0.0465*** -0.0693***
(0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0161)
Conﬂict index at t-3 0.0285 0.0226 0.0221 0.0264 0.00486
(0.0221) (0.0230) (0.0212) (0.0220) (0.0238)
Linguistic Polarization -0.0366*** -0.0322*** -0.0539*** -0.0249*** -0.0389***
(0.00977) (0.00969) (0.0139) (0.00883) (0.0150)
Political Fractionalization -0.150*** -0.144*** -0.166*** -0.156*** -0.179***
(0.0500) (0.0489) (0.0568) (0.0511) (0.0600)
Population (in thousands) 0.0139 0.0890
(0.0220) (0.0641)
Fraction of people with academic degree -0.374** -0.982***
(per thousand people) (0.167) (0.327)
Unemployment rate 0.203** 0.0953
(0.0814) (0.0938)
Number of ﬁnancial establishments -0.00678*** -0.00964***
(per thousand people) (0.00207) (0.00348)
Constant 0.651*** -0.293 -0.457 0.951*** -2.605***
(0.206) (0.391) (0.503) (0.257) (0.945)
First order autocorrelation -2.8966*** -2.888*** -2.8807*** -2.8917*** -2.8839***
Second order autocorrelation -1.3579 -1.3053 -1.4128 -1.2609 -1.2289
Observations 4,469 4,469 3,969 4,444 3,946
Number of Municipalities 250 250 250 249 249
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include
period-speciﬁc dummies. First and second order autocorrelation tests of residuals in the diﬀerenced
model.18 Javier Gardeazabal
Table 6 Further Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conﬂict index at t-1 0.218*** 0.216*** 0.237*** 0.280*** 0.283***
(0.0195) (0.0191) (0.0159) (0.0269) (0.0148)
Conﬂict index at t-2 -0.0775*** -0.0774*** -0.0895*** 0.0441 0.0462
(0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0137) (0.0684) (0.0784)
Conﬂict index at t-3 -0.000644 0.000106 0.0138
(0.0240) (0.0255) (0.0301)
Linguistic Polarization -0.0261*** -0.0605** -0.100**




(Language used at home) (0.0247)
Political Polarization 0.0521** 0.0531** 0.0630*** 0.124**
(Left/Right) (0.0225) (0.0227) (0.0217) (0.0527)
Political Polarization -0.0192 -0.0289** -0.0299** -0.0882***
(Nationalist/Non-Nationalist) (0.0126) (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0254)
Political Fractionalization -0.129**
(0.0632)
Fraction of people with academic degree -0.535*** -0.554*** -0.406** -1.304*** -1.542**
(per thousand people) (0.165) (0.183) (0.190) (0.437) (0.627)
Number of ﬁnancial establishments -0.00557*** -0.0104*** -0.0115***
(per thousand people) (0.00214) (0.00355) (0.00380)
Constant -1.202*** -1.334** -1.002 -2.499 -1.629
(0.461) (0.578) (0.611) (1.533) (2.010)
First order autocorrelation -2.866*** -2.8654*** -2.8463*** -2.9455*** -2.9017***
Second order autocorrelation -1.4319 -1.3883 -0.8221 -1.0727 -1.0509
Observations 4,444 4,444 3,962 4,469 4,469
Number of Municipalities 249 249 249 250 250
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns include
period-speciﬁc dummies. First and second order autocorrelation tests of residuals in the diﬀerenced
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Table 7 Dates available and interpolated
Variable Dates available Interpolated sample
Terrorist assassinations 1981-2008 [1981-2008]
Vote Shares 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 [1989-2008]
Basque Knowledge 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 [1981-2006]
Mother Tongue 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 [1986-2006]
Language Spoken at Home 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 [1991-2006]
Population 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006-2008 [1981-2008]
Employed and Unemployed People 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 [1986-2006]
People with an academic degree 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 [1986-2006]







































Fig. 2 This map shows Basque municipalities clasiﬁed into ﬁve quantiles according to the sum of the spatial conﬂict
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Fig. 3 Linguistic Polarization (Mother Tongue) as a function of the size of the Basque Mother Tongue linguistic
group. Each circle corresponds to a municipality. Data correspond to year 2006 when polarization ranged from 0.07

























































1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
year
Mother Tongue Basque Knowledge
Language Used at Home






Fig. 5 This map shows Basque municipalities clasiﬁed into ﬁve quantiles according to their time average of linguistic
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Fig. 7 This map shows Basque municipalities clasiﬁed into ﬁve quantiles according to their time average of political
polarization.